

# A content integrity service for digital repositories

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## Abstract

We present a “content integrity service” for long-lived digital documents, especially for objects stored in digital repositories. The goal of the service is to demonstrate that information in the repository is authentic and has not been unintentionally or maliciously altered, even after its bit representation in the repository has undergone one or more transformations. We describe our design for an efficient, secure service that achieves this, and our implementation of a prototype of such a service that we developed for DSpace. Our solution relies on one-way hashing and digital time-stamping procedures.

Our service applies not only to transformations to archival content such as format changes, but also to the introduction of new cryptographic primitives, such as the new one-way hash function family that will be chosen by NIST in the competition that was recently announced [9]. In the face of recent attacks on hash functions, this feature is absolutely necessary to the design of an integrity-preserving system that is meant to endure for decades.

## 1 Introduction

Information in a digital repository can include complex multi-part documents. In a long-term repository these documents may be expected to undergo multiple transformations during their lifetime, including, for example, format changes, and modifications to sub-parts and to accompanying metadata. Skeptical users of a digital repository may desire, or in some case may be legally required, to verify the integrity of records that they have retrieved from the repository.

All typical algorithmic techniques for verifying the integrity of a digital object begin with a representation of the object in question as a sequence of bits. When digital objects are transformed in any nontrivial way, their bit representations are changed as well, so that these algorithmic techniques no longer apply to the transformed object. In fact, it is the usual aim of a cryptographic technique for proving integrity that it “fail”—more precisely, that it correctly succeed in proving lack of integrity—when even a single bit in the object’s representation is changed.

We have designed an efficient and secure Content Integrity Service (CIS) that solves this problem [4], and we have implemented it as a service for two different platforms:

- HP’s Digital Media Platform, a service-oriented architecture for content processing and storage [2];
- the DSpace open-source repository platform [10, 3].

We contributed our Dspace implementation to the DSpace SourceForge repository [11]. We invite administrators of DSpace to use it immediately, and implementors of other repository systems to adapt it to their own systems.

The essence of our solution is to use a secure digital time-stamping system, first to time-stamp every document at ingestion into the archive, storing the resulting time-stamp certificate in the archive with the document; and second to produce an auditable record of every transformation to a document in the archive, in such a way as to verifiably link the time-stamp certificate for the transformed version of the document to its original form. This is described in greater detail in §3.2.

Our solution does not use public-key technology at all. As we explain in §3.1 below, current public-key implementations are inappropriate for use in long-lived repository systems.

## 2 Implementations

### 2.1 HP Digital Media Platform

Our first implementation of CIS was built in 2004 as a service for an prototype of HP's Digital Media Platform (DMP), a service-oriented architecture for content processing and storage [2, 4].

The repository data model of DMP is a directed graph with *nodes*, *resources*, and *literals* linked by labelled edges called *properties*, similar to the architecture of (*e.g.*) the JSR 170 Content Repository for Java [7]. All complex documents in the repository are represented using this model. Each subcomponent of a multi-part document is represented as a resource. Nodes are used to represent hierarchy within the document, and literals are strings that may represent metadata. Properties belong to nodes and link them to other nodes, resources or literals. The nodes and resources are named using Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs).

### 2.2 DSpace

In 2007 we reimplemented CIS for the DSpace open-source repository platform [10, 3]. In DSpace, complex documents are called "items". CIS is integrated into DSpace's natural workflow so that CIS certificates are automatically created when an item is ingested into the repository, and when an item is updated in any way (as we will demonstrate with screen shots in our presentation of this work).

We implemented a simple versioning system for DSpace items in order to handle updates.<sup>1</sup> Users of the DSpace repository can make a "verify" call in order to check the validity of any version of a stored item.

In tests of our system, CIS added no noticeable slowdown to the ordinary operations of DSpace.

We give some further details of our implementations in §3.3 below, after explaining our algorithm.

## 3 How it works

### 3.1 Background

The basic building blocks of our solution are cryptographic hash functions and time-stamping procedures, which we briefly explain here. Throughout this article we refer to the objects of concern in a digital archive or repository simply as "documents".

A *cryptographic hash function* is a fast procedure  $H$  that compresses input bit-strings of arbitrary length to output bit-strings (called *hash values*) of a fixed length, in such a way that it is computationally infeasible to find two different inputs that produce the same hash value. (Such a pair of inputs is called a *collision* for  $H$ .) For any digital document  $x$ , its hash value  $v = H(x)$  can be used as a proxy for  $x$ , as if it were a characteristic "fingerprint" for  $x$ , in procedures for guaranteeing the bit-by-bit integrity of  $x$  [8, Chap. 9].

A *digital time-stamping* scheme is a procedure that solves the following problem: given a digital document  $x$  at a specific time  $t$ , produce a *time-stamp certificate*  $c$  that anyone can later use (along with  $x$  itself) to verify that  $x$  existed at time  $t$ . Certificates that will pass the verification test should be difficult to forge. There are two different families of time-stamping algorithms, those using digital signatures and those based entirely on hash functions [5].

In what is sometimes called a *hash-and-sign* time-stamping scheme, the time-stamp certificate for a document consists of a digital signature computed by a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) for the document and the time of signing. This has two major drawbacks as a tool for long-term archives: (1) It requires the assured existence of trustworthy key-validity history data, in order to check the validity of the TSA's public verification key. It is a problem for any TSA to manage such a key-validity database over extended periods of time, let alone integrating it with currently deployed commercial PKIs (public-key infrastructures). To be charitable, not many current PKI systems make a serious effort to build this component with an eye towards long-lasting secure use of the system (and some of them completely ignore it). (2) The trustworthiness of the certificate depends entirely on an assurance that the TSA's private signing key has never been compromised. This is an unacceptable premise for a long-term archive.

For the CIS, we chose a different time-stamping technique called *hash-linking*. In this technique, the hash value of the document to be time-stamped is combined with other hash-values received during the same time period to create a witness hash value. This value is then published by the TSA as a widely witnessed event. Hash-linking makes it computationally infeasible for an adversary to back-date a document, since that would entail computing hash collisions for the witness values. This technique relies only on the collision-resistance properties of hash functions, and does not have any secrets or keys that need to be securely protected over extended periods of time [6, 1].

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<sup>1</sup>This is completely separate from the 2007 Google Summer of Code project to implement a versioning system for DSpace.

## 3.2 Our solution

Before describing our general solution, we first discuss the special case of a particular kind of transformation to a document, namely a method for updating its integrity certificate.

### 3.2.1 Renewing integrity certificates

Here we describe the process of “renewing” digital time-stamps [1]. The need for this is motivated by the fact that, with advances in computational power and resources, as well as the discovery of entirely new cryptanalytic algorithms, particular instances of cryptographic primitives that were secure when they were first deployed may become insecure several years later. In the last three years, the cryptographic community has been surprised by powerful new attacks on most of the widely used hash functions; in response, NIST has recently announced an international competition for the design of a new family of one-way hash functions, similar to the process that led to the adoption of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [9].

Suppose that an implementation of a particular time-stamping system is in place, and consider the pair  $(d, c_1)$ , where  $c_1$  is a valid time-stamp certificate (in this implementation) for a document  $d$ . Now suppose that some time later an improved time-stamping system is implemented and deployed—by replacing the hash function used in the original system with a new hash function, or even perhaps after the invention of a completely new algorithm. Is there any way to use the new time-stamping system to buttress the guarantee of integrity supplied by the certificate  $c_1$  in the face of potential later attacks on the old system?

One could simply submit  $d$  as a request to the new time-stamping system; but this would lose the connection to the original time of certification. Another possibility is to submit  $c_1$  as a request to the the new time-stamping system. But that would be vulnerable to the later existence of a devastating attack on the hash function used in the computation of  $c_1$ , as follows: if an adversary could find another document  $d'$  with the same hash value as  $d$ , then he could use this renewal system to back-date  $d'$  to the original time.

Suppose instead that the pair  $(d, c_1)$  is time-stamped by the new system, resulting in a new certificate  $c_2$ , and that some time after this is done (i.e. at a definite later date), the original method is compromised. The certificate  $c_2$  provides evidence not only that the document contents  $d$  existed prior to the time of the new time-stamp, but that it existed at the time stated in the original certificate,  $c_1$ ; prior to the compromise of the old implementation, the only way to create a valid time-stamp certificate was by legitimate means.

### 3.2.2 Auditable transformation history

Next we show how a similar approach can handle our general problem. For simplicity, we begin with the case where we are only interested in enabling the authentication of an entire document (as opposed to making this possible as well for parts of the document). In its original form, let  $d$  denote the bit-string representation of the document in file format  $f$ , and let us suppose that  $d$  is time-stamped at time  $t$ , with resulting time-stamp certificate  $c$ . We will write  $c = TS(d; t)$  to indicate that the certificate is for input consisting of the document  $d$ , and it was computed at time  $t$ .

Now suppose that at some later time  $t'$ , it is decided to make a format change to format  $f'$ , using a particular conversion or migration procedure. Let  $d'$  denote the bit-string representation of the resulting document. Simply computing a new time-stamp certificate for  $d'$  would lose the connection between  $d'$ , the new representation of the document, and its original version. The aim rather is to memorialize—and enable later verification of—this format conversion, while preserving the assurance of integrity all the way back to that of the original form of the document. We can do this by adapting the procedure for renewing time-stamps described above. Let  $i$  denote a standard way of describing an invocation of the migration procedure used to convert from format  $f$  to format  $f'$ , perhaps including file-names and other useful meta-data for input and output files  $d$  and  $d'$ , respectively. Then, immediately after performing the conversion, a new time-stamp request for  $[d, d', i, c]$  is submitted, and the resulting time-stamp certificate  $c' = TS(d, d', i, c; t')$  is stored with the document in the archive. The new certificate  $c'$  can be used to verify the integrity of the latest form of the original document.

Assuming the integrity of  $i$  as a description of the transformation and the security of the time-stamping system we use, the only way to compromise the security of our solution is to compute collisions for the hash functions used.

Variations on the technique just described can be applied to complex transformations to one or more pieces of a multi-part document, including format conversions, annotations, additions of metadata, and later modifications of the document; these modifications can include the steps of a business workflow, or document redaction, for example. Naturally, transformations can follow one another, and each one can be certified by a CIS certificate.

As far as we are aware, this problem was never seriously addressed before our first publication on the subject [4], perhaps because researchers did not realize that the problem has a simple, secure solution.

### 3.3 Implementation details

Both of our implementations were designed so that they can use any third-party time-stamping system at all. We chose to use the hash-linking time-stamping service provided by Surety, LLC [12].

We handled the job of naming transformations in two different ways in our two implementations. In HP's Digital Media Platform, transformations on content are represented as workflow descriptions expressed as XML documents, and our implementation used this XML representation of a transformation as its invocation *i*. In our DSpace implementation, transformations are updates to items, which can only be made by repository administrators, and we record the administrator's free-text description of an update as its invocation *i*.

For both of our implementations, when we modified content or certificates in the repository (by circumventing the system's usual permissions), verifications of CIS certificates failed, as they should do.

## 4 Future work

We look forward to working with the community in order to make it possible for all content in institutional repositories to be accompanied by cryptographically strong proofs of integrity.

In particular, we plan to extend the functionality of our current DSpace implementation:

- to enable scripted invocation of certificate creation and verification;
- to merge it with any independently contributed versioning system;
- to certify parts of a complex document, using the certificate of the main document;
- to allow stand-alone verification of documents exported from DSpace;
- to renew integrity certificates for documents.

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